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In the United States and in virtually every country around the
world, inflation has declined, and in most countries dramatically so. In
addition, the volatility of inflation and expectations of future inflation
have also fallen significantly. I will call these changes experienced
around the globe the conquest of worldwide inflation.
I will begin by providing a few facts about the substantial improve-
ment of inflation during roughly the past decade compared with the
quarter century that preceded it. I will then try to understand why
this remarkable decline in inflation has taken place. In particular, I
argue that globalization, deregulation, and financial innovation, in
part spurred by experiences of high inflation in the 1980s, have fos-
tered currency competition that has led to improved central bank
performance and, hence, the recent conquest of worldwide inflation.
Friedrich Hayek (1976) had long ago advocated permitting greater
competition among currencies, arguing that there would be a race to
the top rather than a race to the bottom. Regardless of what one
might think of Hayek’s policy proposals, technological change in a
globalized and competitive marketplace, I believe, has increased com-
petition among currencies issued by central banks.
The increased competition among currencies has changed the abil-
ity and the incentives of governments and central banks to pursue
high-inflation policies. As I will argue, such changes have allowed
improvements in central bank independence, governance, and cred-
ibility, thereby leading to better inflation outcomes. In addition,
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135greater central bank credibility has allowed the development of long-
term bond markets in many countries where such markets did not
previously exist and flattened yield curves around the globe as con-
cerns about future inflation risks declined. Deeper bond markets with
a wider range of available maturities encourage long-term planning
and investment, and thus convey lasting gains, particularly in emerg-
ing markets. The important issue is whether the conquest of world-
wide inflation will persist or be a temporary phenomenon.
The Worldwide Decline in Inflation
From the 1950s until the late 1960s, inflation rates were relatively
contained, and episodes of high inflation were rare. Following the
collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early
1970s, however, inflation became a worldwide phenomenon. Even in
Germany, where prices had been the most stable of any country in the
world as tracked by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
purchasing power of the deutsche mark declined by more than half
between 1972 and 1995.
1 For the United States, purchasing power
declined more than 70 percent over this period. For roughly half of
all countries reporting to the IMF, the erosion of value of the cur-
rency was more than 90 percent.
To express this erosion in terms of cumulative inflation, $370 would
be required today in the United Sates to purchase $100 worth of
goods and services at 1972 prices. Brazil has by far had the worst
experience of any country in the world during this period: The price
level in Brazil is approximately five trillion times higher today than it
was in 1972.
Since the early 1990s, however, worldwide inflation has signifi-
cantly declined. In the advanced economies, for instance, the median
inflation rate has fallen from 7 percent in the 1980s to 2 percent in the
current decade. In emerging markets, the median inflation rate has
fallen from 9 percent to 4 percent over the same period. Indeed, the
latest issue of the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic
Outlook shows that average inflation rates in both the advanced
economies and the developing countries in recent years are at their
lowest levels since at least the early 1970s.
2 Indeed, the worst per-
formers over the past five years have had inflation outcomes close to
1Based on changes in consumer prices, 1972 to 2005, from the International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics.
2The IMF does report, however, some modest upward pressure during the past year or so.
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3 Thus, the worst inflation today is
not nearly as bad as it once was.
To give some specific examples, just ten or twenty years ago, annual
inflation rates in Brazil and Mexico exceeded 100 percent. But during
the past five to ten years, Brazilian and Mexican inflation rates have
remained low. In particular, inflation in Brazil failed to spike after
Brazil experienced financial crises and sharp currency depreciations
in the late 1990s. Given Brazil’s history of hyperinflation, this stability
is especially remarkable. Brazil did experience an uptick of inflation
around its presidential election in 2002, but even this was minor by
historical standards. This pattern of reduced inflation is seen across
many countries, large and small, developed and developing.
The data thus clearly show that better inflation performance in the
last decade is a worldwide phenomenon. But is this lower inflation
regime likely to persist? One way to approach this issue is to inves-
tigate whether market participants appear to believe that this change
is temporary or likely to last by examining measures of expected
inflation. In the United States, where surveys go back furthest, long-
term inflation expectations were as high as 8 percent in the early
1980s; they dropped to about 3 percent a decade ago and have since
edged down a bit more, to about 2.5 percent, depending on your
favorite measure of expected inflation.
4 Over the past ten years, other
advanced economies and a few emerging markets such as Korea have
had a broadly similar experience.
5
In Brazil and Mexico, for example, long-term inflation expectations
have declined from a range of 7 percent to 10 percent a decade ago
to a fairly steady 3 percent to 4 percent in recent years. Considering
the high rates of inflation that these economies experienced not long
ago, the low level and stability of long-term inflation expectations in
recent years is remarkable. Indeed, few long-term inflation forecasts
in any country currently exceed 5 percent, although Venezuela pro-
vides one counterexample, with a long-term inflation forecast now of
15 percent. Overall, these surveys suggest that market participants do
expect low inflation to persist around the globe.
3The worst performers are defined as the 90th percentile of inflation rates across countries,
from the IMF, International Financial Statistics. The typical outcome is defined as the 50th
percentile.
4Data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Survey of Professional Fore-
casters.
5The sample of foreign advanced economies consists of the euro area, Japan, and the
United Kingdom. The sample of emerging-market economies consists of Brazil, China,
Korea, and Mexico. Long-horizon forecasts refer to six-year- to ten-year-ahead forecasts
from the April and October surveys of Consensus Economics.
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137In addition, the risks of high inflation appear to have decreased as
well. In particular, the volatility of inflation has declined notably
almost everywhere. The standard deviation of inflation in the United
States declined from as much as 4 percent in the early 1980s to
around 1 percent a decade ago and has remained close to that level
since then.
6 Other advanced economies have had a similar experi-
ence. The decline in volatility is even sharper for the emerging mar-
kets. In the early to mid 1990s, the standard deviation of inflation in
Brazil at times exceeded 100 percent and in Mexico it exceeded 30
percent. In the current decade, however, the standard deviation of
Brazilian inflation has been relatively stable at around 5 percent,
while the standard deviation of inflation in Mexico has declined
steadily to around 2 percent, a level similar to that experienced in the
advanced economies.
Factors behind the Conquest of
Worldwide Inflation
My brief review of worldwide inflation performance suggests that
something has changed in the past decade compared with the previ-
ous two decades: Inflation is substantially lower and less volatile and
expectations of future inflation are also substantially lower. What has
driven this change, which I call the conquest of worldwide infla-
tion?
7 In understanding the key factors behind this change, we can
also shed further light on the likelihood of whether this low inflation
regime will persist.
In a nutshell, I believe that the factors of globalization, deregula-
tion, and financial innovation, arising partly in response to episodes of
high inflation, have effectively eroded the central bank monopoly on
the provision of monetary services and have enhanced global compe-
tition among currencies. These changes have, in turn, altered the
incentives for central banks to behave badly and for finance ministries
to use central banks as “piggy banks” to finance their fiscal policies.
The resulting constraint on monetary policy, combined with increased
public understanding of the costs of inflation, have led to institutional
changes in central bank governance that bolster their credibility for
6Volatility is defined as the twenty-quarter rolling standard deviation of the annualized
inflation rate.
7I have borrowed my title from Thomas J. Sargent (1999), The Conquest of American
Inflation. Sargent focuses on the issue of central bank learning about evolving economic
behavior in a statistical setting, and he does not directly analyze the institutional and
regulatory changes that may be associated with this behavior.
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138maintaining price stability in the future. Improved central bank per-
formance and credibility, thus, are the consequences of this combi-
nation of factors.
To develop this explanation in more detail, I will start by describing
how globalization, deregulation, and innovation can alter the ability
and incentive of a government to pursue a high-inflation policy.
8
These factors are closely related and mutually reinforcing in many
respects. Prompted in part by the collapse of central planning, many
countries have turned increasingly to private markets and trade to
deliver growth and progress. The resulting deregulation and greater
openness has boosted innovation and has helped to increase global
competition, or globalization, by shrinking the barriers of time and
distance. Accordingly, trade and financial linkages between countries
have soared in recent years to record levels.
How does this affect inflation? When governments resort to print-
ing money to finance their spending, inflation rises and nominal assets
lose their value. This loss of value is also known as the inflation tax.
Globalization, deregulation, and innovation make it easier for citizens
to move their wealth out of nominal assets in the local currency
should their government resort to an inflation tax. The demand for
local currency has become much more sensitive to the inflation rate,
and this greater sensitivity reduces the amount of real resources that
the government can obtain for a given level of inflation. Therefore,
the government has a reduced incentive to resort to the inflation tax.
The specific channels by which globalization, deregulation, and
financial innovation affect competition among currencies are many:
• Increased circulation of banknotes in dollars or other hard cur-
rencies enable citizens to conduct transactions and store liquid
wealth without holding inflationary currency. The fraction of
U.S. currency estimated to be held in foreign countries rose
dramatically from less than 20 percent in 1980 to almost 50
percent in the late 1990s, and it has remained near this high level
even as inflation rates have come down almost everywhere.
About $350 billion of U.S. currency is currently held abroad, and
this constitutes effectively an interest-free loan from the rest of
the world to the United States.
8This section draws on Kroszner (2003, 2006). Kenneth Rogoff (2003) proposed another
effect of globalization on inflation. According to Rogoff, greater competition leads not only
to lower but also to more-flexible prices. When prices are more flexible, a central bank’s
ability to temporarily influence output is diminished, while its influence on inflation is
enhanced. Thus, more-competitive markets naturally help central banks achieve price
stabilization.
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both retail and wholesale, enable consumers, investors, and
banks to shift wealth cheaply and quickly away from currencies
and assets subject to inflation and related risks. Over the past
decade or so, many emerging-market economies have adopted
technologies already in use in the advanced economies.
9
• As financial innovations such as credit card networks and money
market mutual funds become more widespread, particularly in
economies that had experienced high inflations, households and
firms have been able to reduce their holdings of cash and central
bank reserves, thus shrinking the “base” for the inflation tax.
Given such developments that facilitate competition among cur-
rencies, a government that pressures a central bank to pursue an
inflationary policy gets much less benefit from increased inflation
because people can more rapidly and conveniently switch out of the
local currency. Indeed, the website of the central bank of Brazil
explicitly acknowledges the role of inflation in driving financial inno-
vations that enabled firms and households to economize on cash
balances in that country. It states, “Prior to the mid-1990s, [when
inflation was stabilized] changes in the payment system in Brazil were
motivated by the need to cope with high inflation rates. During that
time, the system achieved significant technological progress, espe-
cially aimed at enhancing the speed of processing financial transac-
tions.”
10
In addition to encouraging financial innovation, the painful expe-
rience of high inflation helped to educate the public and economists
about the costs of inflation.
11 Although the specific experiences dif-
fered across countries, almost everywhere public opinion eventually
turned against allowing inflation to continue, and this public pressure
reinforced the trend against inflationary policies. Economists and
central bankers also devoted great attention to understanding the
causes and consequences of inflation, providing the intellectual un-
derpinning to policies oriented toward price stability.
In many countries, the factors I have discussed here led to changes
in central banks that may make it more difficult to revert to
9For example, over the past ten years, most major emerging-market economies have imple-
mented real-time gross settlement payment systems, which allow markets to rapidly settle
payments and other obligations with finality during the day (see Bech and Hobijn 2006).
10See www.bcb.gov.br/?PAYSYSREFORM.
11Ortiz (2003) raised this hypothesis in his discussion of Rogoff (2003). For evidence that
voters in Latin America in recent years have punished politicians for bad inflation out-
comes, see Lora and Oliveira (2005).
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140high-inflation policies. The most notable change is the increased in-
dependence of many central banks and the correspondingly reduced
control of the fiscal authorities over monetary policy. Central bank
independence reduces the ability of a government to “rob the piggy
bank” through a surprise inflation tax. In most cases, central bank
independence can be reversed by a majority vote of the national
legislature. But having to resort to such a vote is a greater obstacle to
inflationary finance than that posed by previous arrangements, espe-
cially given the public’s increased sensitivity and aversion to inflation.
Central bank independence has typically been granted in conjunc-
tion with an explicit mandate that makes the achievement of low and
stable inflation one of the goals of monetary policy. Central bank
independence, together with a mandate that includes price stability,
increases the credibility of monetary policy. Policy is credible because
the central bank’s objectives are clear to the public and because the
central bank can be held accountable for failing to achieve its objec-
tives. When citizens are more aware of the costs of inflation, and
when governments are less able to reap benefits from high inflation
and thus have less incentive to use the central bank as a piggy bank,
institutional reforms that make central banks more credible and in-
dependent are more likely to be adopted and sustained.
12
The fundamental forces I have described today—globalization, de-
regulation, financial innovation, and public understanding about the
costs of inflation—provided the impetus for fighting inflation and
opened the political path to institutional reforms, such as central bank
independence, that enhance central bank credibility. Once in place,
these reforms made further progress against inflation easier and
raised the costs of backsliding. As the benefits of stable prices accrue
and as financial markets deepen and become more sophisticated, the
benefits of sound economic policies will help to create support for
institutional reforms that make returning to inflation harder—but not
impossible—for future governments.
Implications of the Conquest for Bond Markets
What are the implications of the conquest of worldwide inflation
for interest rates and yield curves? I believe that market confidence
in continued low inflation has helped drive down the slope of
the yield curve by reducing the premium demanded for holding
12In a paper with Douglas Irwin, I documented a similar dynamic at work in the gradual
reversal of protectionist policies in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s (see Irwin and
Kroszner 1999).
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141long-term nominal assets. The conquest of inflation also has extended
bond maturities and yield curves further into the future than ever
before, most notably in many emerging markets.
The current low level of long-term yields in the United States and
other advanced economies is widely acknowledged as somewhat of a
puzzle, or, to use former Chairman Greenspan’s term, a conundrum
(Greenspan 2005). Of course, flat and even inverted yield curves in
advanced economies are nothing new. We know that the short end of
the yield curve is dominated by monetary policy and cyclical factors.
To abstract from the potential effect of cyclical factors on the yield
curve, consider the pattern of forward rates many years into the
future, at which point the effects of current cyclical shocks would be
expected to no longer be important. The yield on a ten-year bond, for
instance, can be thought of as an average of a series of consecutive
forward rates. If you could borrow and lend at the same rate as the
U.S. Treasury, then you could lock in a three-month loan ten years
from now by borrowing for ten years and three months and simulta-
neously lending the same principal for ten years. The difference be-
tween the interest you pay and the interest you earn on this transac-
tion determines the implied forward rate ten years from today. The
forward rate reflects not only the market expectation of the future
short-term interest rate but also a “term premium” to compensate for
the risk of a commitment to extend credit so far in the future, in-
cluding the risk of future inflation.
At any point in time, then, we can calculate the short-term forward
rate ten years ahead using the yield curve of U.S. Treasury coupon
securities. This “far forward” rate has hovered around historically low
levels of between 4.25 percent and 4.5 percent in the past year, more
than 200 basis points (that is, 2 percent) below its average since 1990.
Far-forward rates in other advanced economies have also declined
over the past decade and are currently at or near historic lows.
13
To some extent, low forward rates may reflect a persistent decline
in expected future real rates of interest or in the real term premium.
Chairman Bernanke has suggested that an excess of ex ante global
saving relative to global investment has held down real interest rates
around the world (Bernanke 2005). Some of the factors behind this
excess of saving over investment include the surge in revenues of oil
and commodity exporters, a retreat in Asian investment demand from
the boom that preceded the late 1990s, and a reduction in fiscal
13Far-forward rates in yen are up about 1 percentage point from their historical lows
associated with the Japanese deflation scares of 1998 and 2003, a level obviously still low in
historical context.
CATO JOURNAL
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also have a nominal aspect. The declines in inflation rates, in the
volatility of inflation, and in surveys of long-term inflation expecta-
tions all point to a reduction in the compensation required by inves-
tors for the effects of future inflation on the returns to holding long-
term bonds.
This development is particularly remarkable in many emerging
markets, in which longer-dated fixed-coupon bonds issued in local
currencies had ceased to exist during the inflationary 1970s and
1980s. The recent lengthening of maturities of domestic-currency-
debt markets has, in many cases, not only extended the yield curve
but—and this is one of the key results of the conquest of inflation—
effectively created a local-currency yield curve that previously did not
exist.
Since 2000, ten-year nominal fixed-coupon bonds in the local cur-
rency have been introduced in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia,
Mexico, and Russia. Korea and Thailand introduced ten-year fixed
coupon bonds in the 1990s. This year the government of Mexico
issued a thirty-year fixed-coupon bond in pesos for the first time. The
proportion of local-currency debt in Mexico maturing within one year
was nearly 90 percent in 2002 and is now less than 75 percent.
14 The
Korean government continues to increase the proportion of its do-
mestic currency debt in longer maturities, with the one-year-and-
under segment falling from roughly one-half in 1999 to one-quarter
by the end of 2005. Moreover, maturity extension is not limited to
emerging markets. France and the United Kingdom, for example,
issued fifty-year bonds in 2005.
In addition to the development or extension of a yield curve world-
wide, bond yields have tended to be relatively low and flat, at least in
part because of the conquest of inflation. The flattening or slight
inversion of yield curves in the major industrial economies, such as
the United States, Japan, the euro area, the United Kingdom, and
Canada is well known. For example, ten-year yields in the euro area
are less than 50 basis points higher than three-month yields and the
yield curve is currently downward-sloping in the United Kingdom.
At the same time that maturities have been extended, bond yields
in local currencies of emerging-market countries have also declined.
It is perhaps not surprising that, given their high rates of saving and
generally high level of economic development, the governments of
Hong Kong and Korea can borrow at levels close to those in the
14I have included floating-rate debt in the one-year maturity category.
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government can borrow in pesos at a thirty-year maturity at only 8
percent. Although Mexico is perhaps the most striking example, it is
not alone. Other middle-income emerging markets with single-digit
yields on fixed-rate ten-year bonds in the local currency include
Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Russia, and Thailand, to name but a few.
The computation of forward rates for most of these countries is dif-
ficult due to the relative sparseness of the maturity distribution, but
for those countries in which five-year forward rates can be computed,
they have been declining and have reached very low levels in the past
year or so.
Overall, the combination of lower and less volatile inflation around
the world has led to a reduction in inflation expectations and lower
perceived inflation risk, and hence to a lower premium in long rates
for inflation uncertainty. I believe that these factors have been im-
portant contributors to the lower long-term yields and the flattening
of yield curves, particularly in emerging markets. The establishment
of markets for long-term nominal government and corporate debt in
countries in which they did not exist a decade ago is powerful evi-
dence of the faith that investors place in a future environment of price
stability.
Broader Economic Benefits
The economic benefits of price stability are too numerous and well
known for me to cover here in detail. Long-run price stability cer-
tainly is essential for achieving maximum employment. However, I
would like to underscore some benefits that are often overlooked,
related to the development of markets for long-term bonds.
Price stability boosts growth by deepening financial markets. Given
stable prices, savers and investors have more confidence about the
ultimate value of their investments. Stable prices encourage the
growth of financial intermediaries and financial markets. As I have
discussed, many emerging markets have recently experienced a deep-
ening of their local financial markets through a greater issuance of
longer-dated paper. There is a strong positive link between banking
and financial market development and economic growth, and a num-
ber of studies have concluded that banking and financial market de-
velopment is a key driver of economic growth. Thus, greater central
bank credibility, which permits more development of local financial
markets, can have an economic benefit beyond the financial sector
(see Levine 2005, Kroszner and Strahan 2006).
The development of long-term local-currency bond markets may
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144also help to enable governments and firms to plan long-term infra-
structure and investment projects that boost economic development.
Although such debt markets are only one of many factors that can
help to lower the costs of long-term planning and enhance the ability
to undertake long-term investments, such developments can improve
decisionmaking. In particular, investment decisions are less likely to
be constrained by having only short-term financing available for
longer-term projects, thereby allowing improved decisionmaking, for
governments, firms, and individuals.
Higher and more stable growth combined with better ability to
undertake long-term plans can help to improve the fiscal outlook for
a country. A better fiscal outlook, in turn, increases confidence and
financial market development and thus further boosts growth and, in
a virtuous cycle, reinforces prospects for continued price stability.
More-prudent fiscal policies, including lower deficits, longer debt
maturities, and reduced foreign-currency debt can reduce the likeli-
hood and potential severity of financial crises. These policies make
the financial positions of emerging-market governments less vulner-
able to movements in interest rates and exchange rates. A reduction
in the perceived risk that a government may not be able to service its
debts makes changes in investor sentiment and financial contagion
less likely, thereby reducing financial market volatility.
Maintaining Progress on the Conquest of
Worldwide Inflation
I have argued that globalization, deregulation, and financial inno-
vation, in part spurred by recent experiences of high inflation, have
fostered currency competition that has led to improved central bank
performance and, hence, the conquest of worldwide inflation. The
resulting enhancement of central bank governance and credibility has
allowed the development of long-term bond markets in many coun-
tries and flattening of yield curves around the globe.
I want to conclude by returning to the question of whether these
phenomena are likely to persist. Globalization and innovation are
genies that may prove difficult to put back in their bottles. Deregu-
lation and global competition, however, may be more subject to
change.
Although I am an optimist, I would be remiss if I did not point out
some risks to this otherwise cheerful narrative of conquest. The dif-
ficulty of reaching agreement in the Doha Round of trade negotia-
tions highlights the risk of renewed protectionism and backtracking
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balization and competition. Barriers to the free flow of goods, ser-
vices, capital, and technology would also diminish the force of inno-
vation that has been so beneficial in the struggle against inflation.
Transactions taxes and administrative barriers may hinder the devel-
opment and liquidity of bond markets and there is still much progress
that is required in many emerging markets on these fronts.
High inflation can destroy an economy and result in enormous
hardship for everyone involved. The benefits achieved through
greater central bank credibility are substantial. Fortunately, economic
forces have led to better central bank behavior around the world
during the past decade. If citizens and politicians lose sight of these
benefits and the forces that have led to enhanced currency compe-
tition are thwarted, these gains could prove fleeting. I believe that we
must continue to work hard to lock in the gains achieved through
anti-inflation credibility to ensure that the conquest will be long last-
ing. The lessons of the high inflation episodes are too important to
forget.
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